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CIVIL PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 
W. Hamilton Bryson* 
This article considers recent developments in the field of Vir-
ginia civil procedure and practice, including statutes, rules of 
court, and opinions of the Supreme Court of Virginia and the 
Court of Appeals of Virginia that have appeared between May 
1985 and May 1986. This article also comments on cases in 
volumes three and four of Virginia Circuit Court Opinions, many 
of which were decided before 1985, but it is appropriate to mention 
them here since they were only recently made generally available 
through publication. 
There have been no major changes in the area of Virginia civil 
procedure during the period considered, but the matters noted 
here may prove useful to keep the reader current with the most 
recent authority for the various already settled principles of prac-
tice and procedure. 
In order to facilitate the discussion of numerous Virginia Code 
sections, they will be referred to in the text by their section num-
bers only. 
I. APPEALS FROM DISTRICT COURTS 
An appeal from a district court and the subsequent trial de novo 
involves the entire case and all of the original parties.1 Therefore, 
an appeal from the general district court to the circuit court trans-
fers the entire file to the circuit court; thus, the principal claim and 
the counterclaim are inseparable for purposes of appeal.2 Following 
a decision of a general district court on a claim and a counterclaim 
that was appealed by the plaintiff but not by the counterclaimant, 
the circuit court will rehear the counterclaim along with the plain-
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; author of 
HANDBOOK ON VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE (1983); editor of VIRGINIA CIRCUIT COURT 0PIN· 
IONS; B.A., 1963, Hampden-Sydney College; LL.B., 1967, Harvard University; LL.M., 1964, 
University of Virginia; Ph.D., 1972, Cambridge University. 
1. Grinnel Fire Protection Sys. Co. v. Sills, 3 Va. Cir. 489 (Alexandria 1979). 
2. General Fin. Corp. v. Woody, 3 Va. Cir. 462 (Richmond 1975) (construing VA. CODE 
ANN. § 16.1-1()6 (Repl. Vol. 1975)). 
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tiff's claim. 3 Since the jurisdiction of the circuit court is derivative, 
a counterclaim made in the circuit court cannot exceed the juris-
dictional limitations of the district court. 4 
The time limit for removing a case from a general district court 
to a circuit court is procedural, not jurisdictional, and it can be 
waived by the failure to appeal from the removal order.5 
A circuit court has no jurisdiction over the interlocutory orders 
of a general district court. 6 
To perfect an appeal from a general district court to a circuit 
court, an appeal bond must be timely filed.7 
II. SERVICE OF PROCESS AND NOTICE OF CLAIMS 
A. General 
Service of process made by posting at an office is invalid; substi-
tuted service under section 8.01-296(2)(b) can be accomplished 
only at a defendant's "usual place of abode."8 
A person who comes into Virginia to attend court is exempt from 
service of process. 9 Furthermore, when a defendant is tricked into 
entering Virginia in order to be served with process, such service is 
invalid.10 
In Stephens v. Stephens,11 Mr. Justice Thomas, writing on be-
half of a unanimous court, held that the "registration of a foreign 
decree in Virginia, pursuant to RURESA, coupled with personal 
service on the defendant in a foreign jurisdiction is not sufficient to 
create in personam jurisdiction over [a] defendant in Virginia."12 
The filing with the commonwealth's attorney of a notice of a 
3. Boyce v. Athey, 4 Va. Cir. 19 (Frederick County 1980). 
4. Willett v. McCullar, 3 Va. Cir. 135 (Alexandria 1983); Gunter v. Platte, 3 Va. Cir. 16 
(Alexandria 1981). 
5. Keith v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 3 Va. Cir. 47 (Alleghany County 1982). 
6. Commonwealth v. Ragno, 3 Va. Cir. 48 (Arlington County 1982). 
7. Swimley v. Lamp, 4 Va. Cir. 22 (Frederick County 1980). 
8. VA. CODE ANN.§ 8.01-296(2)(b) (Repl. Vol. 1984) (emphasis added); see Hall v. Bird, 3 
Va. Cir. 187 (Alexandria 1984). 
9. Voelker v. Voelker, 3 Va. Cir. 78 (Arlington County 1983); see also Commonwealth v. 
Ronald, 8 Va. (4 Call) 665 (1786). Contra Lester v. Bennett, 1 Va. App. 47, 333 S.E.2d 366 
(1985). 
10. Lines v. Lines, 3 Va. Cir. 111 (Arlington County 1983). 
11. 229 Va. 610, 331 S.E.2d 484 (1985). 
12. Id. at 619, 331 S.E.2d at 489. 
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claim against a city does not satisfy the requirements of section 
8.01-222.13 Likewise, actual oral notice given to a city attorney of a 
claim of municipal negligence fails to satisfy the requirements of 
this statute.14 
The notice of a claim of medical malpractice, required by section 
8.01-581.2, must give a "reasonable description" of the complained 
of acts.15 Since notice of a claim for medical malpractice is a pre-
requisite to litigation, a cause of action not stated in the notice 
cannot be sued upon.16 However, the notice of a claim for medical 
malpractice can be amended to include additional claims or par-
ties. This can be done upon motion to the presiding judge, who 
may allow such amendment in his sound judicial discretion in fur-
therance of the ends of justice. The judge may not grant leave to 
amend if the motion is made within ten days of the hearing, if the 
motion is without merit, or if the statute of limitations has expired 
as to the new claims or parties.17 
B. Long Arm Statute 
Long arm jurisdiction exists under sections 8.01-328.1(1) and (2) 
where a management recruitment firm arranges an interview in 
Virginia and guarantees the work to be performed in Virginia.18 
Service of process through the long arm statute can be had upon a 
parent corporation whose subsidiary and agent is transacting busi-
ness in Virginia.19 
A statement in a brochure which is not an off er but a mere solic-
itation sent into the state is not a "transacting" of business for the 
purposes of the long arm statute.20 
Code section 8.01-328.1(8) has been held not to apply where an 
ex-husband had been ordered to pay child support until the child 
was eighteen and, after the child had become eighteen, the ex-wife 
(custodial parent) sued for support of the same child on the 
13. Nicely v. City of Clifton Forge, 3 Va. Cir. 87 (Clifton Forge 1983). 
14. Lash v. City of Alexandria, 3 Va. Cir. 336 (Alexandria 1985). 
15. Glen v. DeLorme, 3 Va. Cir. 349 (Fairfax County 1985); Adams v. Wright, 1 Va. Cir. 
433 (Richmond 1984). The notice given in these two cases was too indefinite. 
16. Monk v. Alexandria Hosp., 4 Va. Cir. 68 (Alexandria 1982). 
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.2:1 (Cum. Supp. 1986). 
18. General Servs. Corp. v. Specialty Consultants, Inc., 3 Va. Cir. 31 (Richmond 1981). 
19. Word Processing Assocs. v. BDT Prods., Inc., 3. Va. Cir. 116 (Arlington County 1983). 
20. Keene v. Pier, 3 Va. Cir. 99 (Arlington County 1983). 
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grounds of the child's incapacity.21 
The long arm statute can only be used to obtain jurisdiction over 
a person who has purposefully availed himself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within this state. 22 
C. Dismissal for Failure to Serve Process Within One Year 
The plaintiff must exercise due diligence to have defendants 
served with process within one year after filing, according to Vir-
ginia Supreme Court Rule 3:3(c).23 A motion to dismiss for failure 
to serve process within one year of filing will be granted no matter 
when it is made after the year has run. Rule 3:3 is automatic and 
the court can act on its own motion.24 Under this Rule, an appear-
ance to have a case dismissed for failure to serve process within 
one year of filing does not challenge the service of process or the 
jurisdiction of the court; therefore, it constitutes a general 
appearance. 25 
III. VENUE 
For venue purposes, a cause of action for nonpayment of an obli-
gation due under a contract arises at the payee's place of business 
under section 8.01-262(4).26 
Since residency is a matter of intention, imprisonment, being in-
voluntary, cannot by itself change residency. The forum non con-
ueniens statute, section 8.01-265, applies to venue in cases under 
the Tort Claims Act. Finding "good cause" for· transferring venue 
to another forum includes considering the places where the cause 
of action arose, where the parties and witnesses reside or work, and 
where documentary evidence is located. 27 
When the defendant is an uninsured motorist, the plaintiff may 
sue wherever the insurance company regularly conducts its busi-
ness through an agent. 28 
21. Nemeroff v. Nemeroff, 3 Va. Cir. 384 (Virginia Beach 1985). 
22. Jennings v. Warren, 4 Va. Cir. 438 (Botetourt County 1977). 
23. Lorcom House Condominium v. Wells, 3 Va. Cir. 226 (Arlington County 1984). 
24. Clark v. Long, 3 Va. Cir. 422 (Arlington County 1971). 
25. Olson v. Pearson, 3 Va. Cir. 76 (Arlington County 1983). 
26. Moore Loans, Inc. v. B. E. Hardin Enters., Inc., 4 Va. Cir. 360 (Richmond 1985). 
27. Shoemaker v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. Cir. 176 (Frederick County 1984). 
28. Gates v. John Doe, 4 Va. Cir. 98 (Winchester 1983) (construing VA. CooE ANN.§ 8.01-
262(3) (Repl. Vol. 1977)). 
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Section 8.01-264(A) was recently amended so that objections to 
venue can be raised "within the period of any extension of time for 
filing responsive pleadings." This makes it clear that the judge can 
extend the time for objecting to venue when he allows an extension 
for the defendant to respond to the plaintiff's first pleading, even 
after the deadline has expired.29 Also, subsection (C) was added to 
this section to require plaintiffs in general district courts to inform 
defendants, in nontechnical language, of their right to object to 
venue. This is not necessary, however, if the action is brought in 
the proper forum. Another amendment to subsection (A) permits a 
defendant in the general district court to make an objection to 
venue by means of a "letter or other written communication." 
Thus, when a defendant from Jonesville is sued in the district 
court in Eastville, he need not go to the Eastern Shore (where the 
amount sued for may not be very great) to make his objection to 
venue. It is unfair for a plaintiff to choose an inconvenient and 
incorrect forum in order to make it difficult for a defendant to go 
to court and defend himself. 
IV. PARTIES 
Failure to comply with section 59.1-69, the Fictitious Name stat-
ute, bars a plaintiff's right to sue. The failure of the defendant to 
object does not waive the requirements of the statute. The plain-
tiff's compliance before entry of final judgment, however, will cure 
the defect existing when the action was brought.30 
Neither a partnership nor a trust fund is an "unincorporated as-
sociation" for the purposes of suing or being sued under section 
8.01-15.31 However, a condominium unit owners' association may 
maintain an action. 32 
Although statutory beneficiaries of an estate are entitled to be 
present at litigation concerning the estate, said litigation is con-
ducted only by the personal representative and only the latter can 
29. The same result was reached in Carter v. Mount Vernon Hosp., 3 Va. Cir. 162 (Alex-
andria 1984) (construing the statute before the 1986 amendment). 
30. C. M. Prods. v. Milne, 3 Va. Cir. 4 (Alexandria 1980). 
31. Krzyston's Adm'r. v. Teamsters Joint Counsel No. 83 of Virginia Pension Fund, 3 Va. 
Cir. 479 (Richmond 1976) (trust fund); Buchanan Apartments Assocs. v. Arlington County, 
3 Va. Cir. 447 (Arlington County 1974) (partnership). 
32. Frantz v. CBI Fairmac Corp., 229 Va. 444, 450-51, 331 S.E.2d 390, 395 (1985) (con-
struing VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.53 (Repl. Vol. 1974)). 
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compel discovery from the defendants.aa The statutory benefi-
ciaries are not proper parties, but neither are they strangers to the 
suit. Note also that an insurance carrier is not a proper party to an 
action to establish the liability of its insured, but neither is it a 
stranger to the action.a4 
v. CRAVING OYER 
If a document relied upon in the plaintiff's motion for judgment 
is ~led with and mentioned in the motion for judgment, no formal 
prof ert of that document is needed in modern Virginia practice. a1> 
However, if the plaintiff's claim is based upon a deed that is not 
filed with the motion for judgment, the defendant cannot file a de-
murrer based upon the deed because it is not part of the record. 
To remedy this situation, the defendant can make a motion crav-
ing oyer of the document and the judge will order it to be pro-
duced and filed; thus, it becomes a matter of record upon which 
the defendant can rely in his demurrer.as 
The defendant can crave. oyer of and force the plaintiff to pro-
duce bonds, deeds, letters of probate and administration, and court 
records.a' One can have oyer only of documents upon which the 
plaintiff has based a claim of justification.as Formerly, oyer of in-
struments not under seal was not allowed, a9 but now the practice 
is otherwise. 40 
VI. REs JumcATA 
The principles of res judicata and the reluctance to give new 
laws retrospective effect must yield to the more compelling public 
33. Leary v. Broughman, 3 Va. Cir. 105 (Bath County 1983). 
34. Phelps v. Watts, 2 Va. Cir. 442 (Lynchburg 1975). 
35. VA. SuP. CT. R. 1:4(i); see also VA. SuP. CT. R. 1:4(f). It was not necessary at common 
law to make profert of instruments that were not under seal. 
36. Wood v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 329 (1826); Macon v. Crump, 5 Va. (1 Call) 
575, 582 (1799). See generally M.P. BURKS, PLEADING AND PRACTICE 633-36 (4th ed. 1952); 
14B MICHIE's JuR. Profert and Oyer (Repl. Vol. 1978). 
37. Culpeper Nat'l Bank v. Morris, 168 Va. 379, 382, 191 S.E. 764, 765 (1937) (court 
records); Smith v. Lloyd, 57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 295 (1862) (deed; impossibility excuses produc-
tion); Moore v. Fenwick, 21 Va. (Gilmer) 214 (1821) (bond); Mason's Stores v. National Co., 
3 Va. Cir. 405 (Richmond 1966). 
38. Smith v. Wolsiefer, 119 Va. 247, 250, 89 S.E. 115, 116 (1916); Langhorne v. Richmond 
Ry. Co., 91 Va. 369, 372-73, 22 S.E. 159, 160 (1895). 
39. M. P. BURKS, supra note 36, at 633, 636. 
40. See, e.g., Ernst, Inc. v. Blake Constr. Co., 1 Va. Cir. 278 (Richmond 1982). 
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duty to favor the rights of children. Hence, in Jones v. Withrow,41 
a second civil petition to determine paternity was heard because: 
(1) the law allowing genetic blood grouping tests had been changed 
since the first hearing, which was dismissed; and (2) the infant was 
not an independent party at the first hearing. Section 20-61.1, 
dealing with paternity suits, cannot be applied retrospectively to a 
child born in 1970 except when actions within the provisions of 
this section occur subsequent to the amendment of the statute. 
New laws are presumed to be prospective, not retrospective, in 
operation. 42 
Where devisees institute legal proceedings to have themselves 
declared trustees and the court so orders, the descendants of said 
devisees are bound thereby.43 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion, article IV, section 1, does not require a state to recognize a 
foreign judgment enforcing a contract that is against that state's 
own public policy.44 
During the last session of the General Assembly, a bill was filed 
to enact the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act 
("Act"), 45 but it failed to pass. This Act would codify the Virginia 
common-law rules of comity. The foreign country judgment would 
still have to be domesticated in a Virginia court according to sec-
tion 3 of the Act. Section 4(2)(3) retains the rule that a foreign 
judgment which offends the strong public policy of our state will 
not be granted comity or be recognized. Secion 7 preserves the gen-
eral common law of comity in matters not covered by the Act. By 
the common law of comity, which is a doctrine of private interna-
tional law, the Virginia courts will recognize a judgment of a sister 
state or of a foreign country as a personal obligation unless it con-
travenes some Virginia public policy; this obligation constitutes a 
cause of action in a local court.46 
The desirability of codifying the common law of comity is to 
make clear to foreign jurists that their judgments are enforceable 
in Virginia. Many foreign countries have reciprocity provisions on 
41. 3 Va. Cir. 277 (Roanoke 1985). 
42. Averette v. Seabron, 3 Va. Cir. 467 (Henrico County 1976). 
43. Counts v. Perry, 4 Va. Cir. 149 (Scott County 1984). 
44. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., v. Furman, 4 Va. Cir. 141 (Newport News 1983). 
45. 13 U.L.A. 261-75 (1986). 
46. See VA. ConE ANN. § 8.01-389(B) (Rep!. Vol. 1984). 
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this subject and their judges will not enforce Virginia judgments 
unless they are convinced that Virginia courts will enforce theirs. 
Most European countries have general codes, and their bench and 
bar feel unsure of themselves when presented with a point of com-
mon law. Therefore, when enforcement of a Virginia judgment is 
attempted abroad, it is more effective to show the judge a statute 
than a line of judicial opinions to prove that reciprocity exists. The 
proposed Act will therefore benefit Virginia litigants abroad as a 
practical matter while adding nothing to the rights of foreign liti-
gants in Virginia. As the commerce of Virginia becomes more in-
ternational, and as more foreign companies move their operations 
to Virginia, the passage of this Act will benefit Virginians suing 
corporations whose assets are located abroad. 
The aforementioned Act is completely distinct and separate 
from the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act,47 which 
was also recently proposed and defeated by the General Assembly. 
This latter act would avoid the necessity of a judgment creditor 
having to domesticate a sister-state's judgment in a Virginia court. 
Instead, he could simply file an authenticated copy in the clerk's 
office. Thus, he could get execution without having to go through 
any judicial process where the matter is not contested. The clerk or 
the judgment creditor would mail a notice of the filing to the judg-
ment debtor. At this time, the debtor could go into court to have 
the levy stayed or vacated. The present procedure requires the 
judgment creditor to serve a motion for judgment on the judgment 
debtor; thus, the debtor can appear at the trial to domesticate the 
foreign judgment and make his defenses at that time. The most 
frequent defense to foreign judgments is lack of jurisdiction. One 
could also object on the grounds of forgery of the judgment prof-
fered. The purpose of this proposed legislation is to remove rou-
tine, undefended actions in the nature of a debt on a judgment 
from the dockets of the circuit courts and to domesticate a foreign 
judgment. This procedural statute would not change any substan-
tive rights. Thus, in a recent case,48 the judge could have vacated 
or quashed a New Jersey judgment, had it been filed in Virginia, 
on the grounds that such judgment (the enforcement of gambling 
debts) is against Virginia public policy. 
47. 13 U.L.A. 149-205 (1986). 
48. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 4 Va. Cir. 141. 
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VII. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS 
A. General 
If a case is discontinued under section 8.01-335(A) and later re-
instated, it is not barred by the statute of limitations.49 The stat-
ute of limitations may be tolled when the plaintiff is of "unsound 
mind" without the plaintiff's being adjudicated insane. 50 
B. Accrual 
A cause of action on a wrongful deduction from a bank account 
accrues when the depositor is notified of the deduction.51 The obli-
gation of a demand note accrues on the date it was made. 52 
It was held by the Supreme Court of Virginia, in an opinion by 
Mr. Justice Cochran, that "where property is in the possession of a 
bailee, a cause of action in detinue accrues upon a demand and 
refusal to return the property or upon a violation of the bailment 
contract by an act of conversion."53 
Where trustees of a pension and welfare plan have the duty to 
notify an employee that payments of his life insurance premiums 
are being terminated and they fail to perform that duty, which is a 
duty of "continuous service," the statute of limitations does not 
begin to run until "the termination of the undertaking."54 
In order to reaffirm the common law as stated in Nationwide 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Jewel Tea Co.,55 section 8.01-249(5) was 
enacted. This section states that a cause of action for contribution 
or indemnification does not arise until there has been a payment or 
discharge of the obligation, even though there may have been a 
third-party claim for an inchoate right to contribution or indemni-
fication. This addition to section 8.01-249 was enacted to override 
the erroneous opinions in Rambone v. Critzer56 and Smith-Moore 
49. Castagna v. Humana of Va., 3 Va. Cir. 71 (Virginia Beach 1982). 
50. Schnedl v. O'Donnell, 3 Va. Cir. 113 (Alexandria 1983) (construing VA. CODE ANN. § 
8.0l-229(A)(2)(b) (Repl. Vol. 1977)). 
51. Fox v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 3 Va. Cir. 74 (Arlington County 1983). 
52. Guth v. Hamlet Assocs., 230 Va. 64, 334 S.E.2d 558 (1985) (construing VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 8.3-122(1) (Add. Vol. 1977)). 
53. Gwin v. Graves, 230 Va. 34, 37, 334 S.E.2d 294, 297 (1985). 
54. Rowlett v. Pearsall, 3 Va. Cir. 372 (Roanoke 1985). 
55. 202 Va. 527, 118 S.E.2d 646 (1961). 
56. 548 F. Supp. 660 (W.D. Va. 1982). 
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Body Co. u. Heil Co. 57 
The two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice, sec-
tion 8.0l-243(A), has been modified by the addition of subsection 
(C). The period of limitation is now extended to one year after the 
date of discovery in both the case of a foreign object having been 
left inside someone's body, and in the case of a fraudulent conceal-
ment of a medical condition. However, in no case can such an ac-
tion be brought after ten years following the accrual of the cause of 
action. Note that subsection (C) is an extension of subsection (A), 
not a substitution; it does not reduce the two-year period of sub-
section (A). 
C. Time Limits 
A seller of land who misrepresents the zoning status of neighbor-
ing land has committed a fraud, and the one-year statute of limita-
tions applies.58 Similarly, it is fraud when a person agrees to sell 
land to the plaintiff but sells it to someone else, and an action 
therefore is barred after one year by section 8.01-248.59 
Malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and defamation are 
personal actions covered by the one-year limitations period of sec-
tion 8.01-248. Assault and battery, however, are personal actions 
for personal injuries covered by the two-year limitations period of 
section 8.0l-243(A).60 
The Supreme Court of Virginia, in an opinion by Mr. Justice 
Russell, ruled that the five-year statute of limitations of section 
8.01-250 protects parties who manufacture or supply construction 
materials that are incorporated into a building. 61 
57. 603 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Va. 1985). 
58. Pigott v. Moran, 231 Va. 76, 341 S.E.2d 179 (1986) (construing VA. CooE ANN. § 8.01-
248 (Repl. Vol. 1984)). 
59. Barney v. Bell, 3 Va. Cir. 93 (Virginia Beach 1983). 
60. Reinforced Earth Co. v. Ashcraft & Gere!, 3 Va. Cir. 143 (Alexandria 1983) (defama-
tion); Beasley v. Kayo Oil Co., 3 Va. Cir. 119 (Chesterfield County 1983). 
61. Cape Henry Towers, Inc. v. National Gypsum Co., 229 Va. 596, 331S.E.2d476 (1985). 
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VIII. DISCOVERY 
A. General 
A defendant can take a deposition as soon as an action is pend-
ing under Rule 4:5(a).62 
Rule 4:5(b)(7), which relates to telephonic depositions, was re-
cently amended to permit a judge, upon a proper motion, to allow 
such depositions to be taken. Formerly, telephonic depositions 
were allowed only upon the written stipulations of the parties and 
were therefore unavailable in those cases of parties, known and un-
known, served by publication or otherwise, who did not appear and 
were thus in default. At one point in the amendment process it was 
proposed to delete the requirement (the second sentence of the 
subsection) that the deponent give his answers in the presence of 
the court reporter. However, this deletion would have increased 
the possibility of an imposter giving the deposition, since the court 
reporter would have been on the other end of the telephone. Fur-
thermore, the deponent's attorney might have had the opportunity 
to write out the answers for the deponent to read over the phone, 
which could not be easily detected by the other parties or the 
reporter. 
In medical malpractice cases, any party may remove part of the 
record for inspection and copying from the office of the clerk of 
court or the Executive Secretary of the supreme court. 63 
A subpoena duces tecum can be issued to a party or a non-party 
witness in a district court,64 in proceedings under section 8.01-506 
(which provides for judgment debtor interrogatories),65 and in ses-
sions before arbitrators. 66 A subpoena duces tecum under Rule 4:9 
may be issued to persons who live out of state even if they cannot 
be served out of state. 67 
A suit may be dismissed for the failure to make the agreed upon 
discovery giving the names of expert witnesses to be used in a 
medical malpractice action.68 In assessing attorney's fees under 
62. Livingston v. Meany, 3 Va. Cir. 222 (Arlington County 1984). 
63. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.4:1, -581.4:2 (Cum. Supp. 1986). 
64. Id. §§ 16.1-89, -131. 
65. Id. § 8.01-506.1. 
66. Id. § 8.01-581.06. 
67. Missirlian v. Hall, 3 Va. Cir. 460 (Arlington County 1975). 
68. Winfree v. Richmond Memorial Hosp., 3 Va. Cir. 387 (Richmond 1985). 
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Rule 4:12(a)(4), the court is not bound by the contract between the 
attorney and his client but may assess a reasonable fee. 69 
Sanctions for failure to make discovery cannot be levied against 
an uninsured motorist insurance carrier where the uninsured mo-
torist cannot be found. However, if information is sought under the 
provisions of Part Four of the Rules of Court, the insurance com-
pany must give any information it has.70 Therefore, when John 
Doe fails to answer interrogatories or fails to appear to give a depo-
sition, the plaintiff cannot have summary judgment. 71 
Although statutory beneficiaries of an estate are entitled to be 
present at litigation concerning the estate, such litigation is con-
ducted only by the personal representative, and only the represen-
tative can compel discovery from the defendants.72 
A plaintiff will not be required to submit to a second medical 
examination under Rule 4:10 simply because the first was con-
ducted by a different physician for the insurance company before 
the action was brought. Under Rule 4:9(c), a physician need only 
produce the report given to the patient, the results of tests in con-
nection therewith, the medical history ~f the patient, and the 
names of other physicians consulted, but not the patient's entire 
file.73 
B. Scope 
The origin of the present discovery devices under Part Four of 
the Rules of Court lies in the traditional practice of the equity 
courts, and the traditional scope of discovery was limited to admis-
sible, relevant evidence.74 However, current Rule 4:1(b) expands 
the scope of discovery in modern practice to include any matter 
"relevant to the subject matter" of the suit (rather than only mat-
ter relevant to the issues pleaded), and any matter "reasonably cal-
culated to lead to ... admissible evidence" (rather than only ad-
missible evidence itself). For example, evidence of post-accident 
changes of design is discoverable, but not admissible.75 Rule 4:1(b) 
69. Bell v. Rosenthal Chevrolet Co., 3 Va. Cir. 449 (Arlington County 1974). 
70. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2204(c)(Repl. Vol. 1986). 
71. See Egan v. Jones, 1 Va. Cir. 235 (Richmond 1981). 
72. Leary v. Broughman, 3 Va. Cir. 105 (Bath County 1983). 
73. Hooper v. Russo, 4 Va. Cir. 475 (Arlington County 1978). 
74. E.g., Hornback v. Highway Comm'r, 205 Va. 50, 53, 135 S.E.2d 136, 138 (1964); Tur-
ner v. Binion, Hardres 200, 145 Eng. Rep. 452 (Exch. 1661). 
75. Turner v. Manning, Inc., 216 Va. 245, 253, 217 S.E.2d 863, 869 (1975). 
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could be intepreted to allow fishing for everything that is not privi-
leged. Such a broad interpretation, however, would permit gross 
abuse, harrassment, oppression, and expense incurred to the other 
parties and to witnesses. This rule cannot be adequately redrafted 
to permit reasonable and legitimate discovery and at the same 
time to prohibit abusive discovery. The solution lies in its reasona-
ble interpretation by the courts. It is the opinion of this writer that 
the courts should be stricter than they are at present; the abuse of 
discovery has become one of the worst aspects of modern civil liti-
gation. As the general rule is applied to individual factual situa-
tions, a body of case law will develop to guide attorneys in the fu-
ture. The following opinions, then, are the beginning of such a 
process. 
At a deposition, even questions that are irrelevant to the issues 
must be answered unless there is a valid claim of privilege.76 How-
ever, the court will not require a party to respond to requests to 
admit that are unnecessary or of dubious relevance. A party may 
be requested to admit the genuineness of medical records but not 
the veracity of the contents of the records. 77 
The tax returns and past income of a former wife are totally im-
material to the issue of the former husband's liability for past-due 
child support because those payments are vested and the court 
cannot change the amounts due. Thus, such information is not 
discoverable. 78 
A defendant may be required to answer interrogatories as to the 
standard of medical care. 79 
It is not a valid objection to an interrogatory, in current practice, 
that the proponent already has the information. However, an inter-
rogatory cannot require a complete summation of all evidence to 
be produced at the trial. An interrogatory may, however, ask for 
the names of all witnesses who have knowledge of the matters of 
the case.80 
A party's prior conduct that is not relevant to the issues cannot 
76. In re Estate of Sampson, 3 Va. Cir. 248 (Alexandria 1984). 
77. Schnedl v. O'Donnell, 3 Va. Cir. 113 (Alexandria 1983) (construing VA. SuP. CT. R 
4:11). 
78. Johnson v. Johnson, 1 Va. App. 330, 332, 338 S.E.2d 353, 355 (1986). 
79. Goodwin v. Arlington Hosp. Ass'n, 3 Va. Cir. 362 (Arlington County 1985); cf. Simp-
son v. Larson, 1 Va. Cir. 223 (Pulaski County 1981). 
80. North American Eng'g Co. v. Vukic, 3 Va. Cir. 416 (Arlington County 1970). 
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be the subject of discovery.81 
Upon appeal, the Board of Zoning Appeals is subject to discov-
ery as to matters of additional evidence under Rule 4:0 in Part 
Four of the Rules of Court. Any officer or agent of the Board may 
respond. 82 On the other hand, it has been ruled that discovery 
under Part Four is not available in a judicial proceeding under sec-
tion 60.1-67.1 to review a decision of the Virginia Employment 
Commission. 83 
G. Privileges 
Discovery procedures cannot be used to require self-incrimina-
tion in civil cases. Unless authorized by statute, use immunity can-
not be granted. The privilege against self-incrimination, however, 
does not apply to records kept as required by law.84 
State tax returns are confidential unless a judge finds that the 
ends of justice require otherwise. If the information sought can be 
obtained from other sources, or if it is not of high probative value, 
the tax returns should be kept confidential pursuant to section 58-
48.4. s5 
Letters sent to an attorney that contain opinions regarding 
pending litigation are privileged from discovery.86 A non-party wit-
ness is entitled under Rule 4:1(b)(3) to have a copy of any state-
ment previously made by him, including a copy of a tape recorded 
interview. This is an exception to the work-product privilege.87 
Where the employees of the defendant have given statements to 
the defendant immediately following the occurrence and, two years 
later, refuse to give information to the plaintiffs under the instruc-
tions of the defendant, the court will override the work product 
privilege and order copies of the statements to be produced under 
Rule 4:9.88 
81. Klein v. Dart Drug Corp., 3 Va. Cir. 451 (Arlington County 1974). 
82. Joynt v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 3 Va. Cir. 65 (Alexandria 1982). 
83. Walker v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 3 Va. Cir. 67 (Bath County 1982). 
84. City of Alexandria v. Thorne, 3 Va. Cir. 27 (Alexandria 1981); see also Green v. Sixty-
Seventh Co., 1 Va. Cir. 115 (Richmond 1972). 
85. Commonwealth v. Krbec, 3 Va. Cir. 165 (Virginia Beach 1984). 
86. Shirley Contracting Corp. v. King, 3 Va. Cir. 149 (Arlington County 1984). 
87. Putnam v. Schulz, 3 Va. Cir. 351 (Richmond 1985). 
88. See Brugh v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 4 Va. Cir. 477 (Botetourt County 1979) (apply-
ing VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:1(b)(3)). 
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IX. LEVIES AND SEIZURES 
At the last session of the General Assembly, a large number of 
small changes were made to further protect defaulting defendants, 
debtors, and tenants. These changes also will avoid possible consti-
tutional problems with the statutes governing proceedings in deti-
nue, fieri facias, pre-judgment attachments, and distress for rent.89 
Similar improvements to the statutes providing for garnishments 
were made in 1984.90 
Process to seize property in actions in detinue under sectiop. 
8.01-114 can no longer be issued by clerks of court; they now may 
only be issued by judges or magistrates. Section 55-230 was simi-
larly amended so that only judges and magistrates may issue dis-
tress warrants. 
The statutory provisions for detinue,91 writs of :fieri facias,92 pre-
judgment attachments,93 and distress for rent94 have been modified 
to require that the writs, as well as a form for requesting a hearing 
on exemptions from levy or seizure, be served on the defendant. 
Such a hearing is claimed by the defendant's filing the request 
with the clerk of the court. The clerk will thereupon schedule the 
hearing to be held within ten business days and must notify all 
interested parties thereof. 
X. JURIES 
There is a right to a jury trial on factual issues regarding the 
validity of a release. The validity of a release and the merits of the 
case should be tried by separate juries. 95 
In a dispute over the location of a right of way, the parties have 
a right to a jury trial regarding the common-law right to the ease-
ment. Although one party may get a preliminary injunction to re-
quire the other to maintain the status quo pendente lite, the eq-
uity judge may not transfer the entire dispute to the equity side of 
the court because this would deprive the parties of their right to a 
89. 1986 Va. Acts 568-73. 
90. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-511, -512.4, -512.5 (Cum. Supp. 1986). 
91. Id. §§ 8.01-114, -115, -119. 
92. Id. §§ 8.01-466, -477.1, -483, -487.1. 
93. Id. §§ 8.01-533, -546, -546.1, -546.2. 
94. Id. §§ 55-230, -232, -232.1, -232.2 (Repl. Vol. 1986). 
95. Bolen v. Overnite Transp. Co., 3 Va. Cir. 345 (Richmond 1985). 
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common law trial by jury. After title to the easement has been de-
termined, then the injunction may be made permanent or there 
may be an action at common law for trespass to property, depend-
ing upon the outcome of that litigation. 96 
On the subject of juries, it has been proposed several times re-
cently that there be no classes of persons who are exempt from 
service on juries. The lists of exempt persons contained in sections 
8.01-341 and 8.01-341.1 is extraordinary; it appears that any group 
of people that is sufficiently well organized to have a lobbyist in 
the corridors of the General Assembly is exempt from jury duty. If 
one is entitled to a jury that is representative of the entire commu-
nity, then this situation should not exist. Many of the jurisdictions 
that have abolished exemptions from jury service have eased the 
inconvenience of service by the "one-day/one-trial" rule. By this 
rule, a person is required to appear for jury duty on one day only 
and, if he is empaneled, he sits for only one trial. If, however, he is 
not empaneled, he has no further obligation. These are worthy pro-
posals, and it is hoped that they will receive further consideration. 
XI. INCIDENTS OF TRIAL 
A commissioner in chancery is not a delegate of the judge. A 
commissioner's report, though not entitled to the weight given to a 
jury's verdict, should be accepted unless clearly erroneous.97 
Where a jury finds for a defendant and indirectly favors a third-
party defendant, the latter is not a prevailing party for the purpose 
of receiving court costs.98 
The words "amount recovered" in section 8.01-35.1 refer to the 
judgment recovered and not to the amount actually paid by each 
tortfeasor. 99 
In Ambiance Associates, Inc. v. Kilby,1°0 the court ruled that a 
verdict that has been set aside cannot be reinstated by the trial 
judge. This writer, however, agrees with the dissenting opinion in 
the case. Although it was not mentioned in the dissent, the su-
preme court has the power to reinstate a verdict. Thus, the verdict 
96. Stanardsville Volunteer Fire Co. v. Berry, 229 Va. 578, 331 S.E.2d 466 (1985). 
97. Collins v. Collins, 3 Va. Cir. 224 (Arlington County 1984). 
98. Winston v. Diehl, 3 Va. Cir. 129 (Henrico County 1983). 
99. West v. Community Hosp., 3 Va. Cir. 258 (Roanoke 1984). 
100. 230 Va. 60, 334 S.E.2d 556 (1985). 
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is not "void." The trial judge should also have the power to rein-
state the verdict as long as his jurisdiction continues. 
XII. APPEALS FROM CIRCUIT COURTS 
The requirement of Rule 5A:6(a), that a notice of appeal to the 
court of appeals be filed with the clerk of that court within thirty 
days after the final judgment, is not jurisdictional; on the other 
hand, the failure to make a timely filing with the clerk of the cir-
cuit court is mandatory and jurisdictional. IOI 
lt is a mandatory part of the appeals process that a transcript or 
a written statement of facts be filed with the appellate court. Rule 
5A:3(b) permits the circuit court judge to extend the deadline for 
filing a transcript, but the court of appeals has not been given such 
power.I02 
The General Assembly enacted a new subsection (L) to Code 
section 8.01-676.1. This subsection declares that the failure to file a 
timely appeal bond with the supreme court or the court of appeals 
is no longer jurisdictional. Now an appellate court judge may ex-
tend the deadline for filing an appeal bond in his court. Although 
the statute is silent on the point, it is submitted that an extension 
of time can also be granted after the expiration of the deadline 
where this would attain the ends of justice. This new subsection 
overrules several recent cases which held that, under the statute 
before the amendment, the timely filing of an appeal bond was 
mandatory and jurisdictional and beyond the aid of the present 
Rules 5:24 and 5A:17(b).I03 
XIII. MISCELLANEOUS 
Where a defendant inadvertently files his responsive pleading in 
the wrong circuit court, this is a clerical mistake that can be cured 
under section 8.01-428(B), and the court may set aside a default 
101. Turner v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 96, 341 S.E.2d 400 (1986); Johnson v. Com-
monwealth, 1 Va. App. 510, 339 S.E.2d 919 (1986); Williams v. Landon, 1 Va. App. 206, 336 
S.E.2d 907 (1985) (habeas corpus). 
102. Turner, 2 Va. App. 96, 341 S.E.2d 400; Barrett v. Barrett, 1 Va. App. 378, 339 S.E.2d 
208 (1986). 
103. See Rudiger & Sons v. Hanckel-Smith Sales Co., 230 Va. 255, 335 S.E.2d 257 (1985); 
Duckett v. Duckett, 1 Va. App. 279, 337 S.E.2d 759 (1985); Burns v. C. W. Wright Constr. 
Co., 1 Va. App. 256, 336 S.E.2d 908 (1985). 
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judgment.104 Similarly, an inconsistency in a final decree for child 
support is considered to be a mere clerical mistake.105 Where a per-
son intends to do one thing but inadvertently does another, this is 
also a clerical error that can be corrected by a nunc pro tune order. 
The court can correct such errors made by counsel as well as those 
made by itself and its clerk.106 
When the liability of an employer is based solely upon the doc-
trine of respondeat superior, there can be no recovery against him 
when the employee has been discharged from liability for damages 
caused by the act of the employee.107 
Section 8.01-35.1, which states that the release of one joint 
tortfeasor does not release the other, also includes those parties 
who may be vicariously liable. This statute does not use the words 
"joint tortfeasors" but rather "persons liable in tort for the same 
injury."108 
Rule 1A:4 was recently amended to require that when a foreign 
attorney associates himself with a member of the Virginia State 
Bar as local counsel in a particular suit, the local attorney must 
sign all pleadings and papers, including those relating to discovery. 
As to cross-bills against plaintiffs in equity, Rule 2:13 was re-
cently amended to require plaintiffs to respond within twenty-one 
days after service, rather than after filing, of the cross-bill. This 
technical amendment avoids the possibility of the defendant's fil-
ing a cross-bill and not giving the plaintiff any notice of it until 
after the twenty-one days has expired (the cross-bill then being 
deemed admitted under Rule 1:4(e)). Such a maneuver was never 
anticipated by the orignal drafters of the rule. 
Within ten days after a chairman of a medical malpractice re-
view panel is appointed, he is to advise the parties of the date he 
has set for the completion of discovery. This date is to be within 
ninety days of his appointment unless good cause is shown for a 
longer period. The date set for the hearing shall not be sooner than 
ten days after the completion of the discovery.109 
104. Zaki v. Abell, 3 Va. Cir. 232 (Arlington County 1984). 
105. Cass v. Lassiter, 3 Va. Cir. 260 (Virginia Beach 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 2 Va. 
App. 273, 343 S.E.2d 470 (1986). 
106. In re Warren, 4 Va. Cir. 144 (Shenandoah County 1983). 
107. Haskins v. Tepper Bros. Realty Co., 4 Va. Cir. 389 (Richmond 1970). 
108 Thurston Metals, Inc. v. Taylor, 231 Va._, 339 S.E.2d 538 (1986); Bacher v. Vulcan 
Materials Co., 1 Va. Cir. 314 (Fairfax County 1982). 
109. VA. ConE ANN. § 8.01-581.3:1 (Cum. Supp. 1986). 
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The Uniform Arbitration Act110 was passed by the last session of 
the General Assembly. This comprehensive legislation, for the 
most part, codifies the established common law. One important 
change is in section 8.01-581.06, which allows the arbitrators to is-
sue subpoenas to witnesses, to compel the production of docu-
ments, and to permit depositions de bene esse. Under section 8.01-
581.04(3), the powers of the arbitrators are exercised by a majority 
unless it is otherwise agreed; whereas at common law, the arbitra-
tors must act unanimously unless it is otherwise agreed. m Appeals 
are allowed from interlocutory orders compelling arbitration or 
staying arbitration.112 Under former section 8.01-580, an arbitra-
tor's award will be set aside if based upon a "palpable error of 
gross inattention."113 Perhaps, under the new statute, the court 
will modify the award by correcting the miscalculation or mistake 
in the description under subsection 8.01-581.011(1). 
Code section 49-7 was amended to restate the settled practice 
and to clarify the statutory law that allows an attorney to sign an 
affidavit on behalf of a corporation or other entity. This amend-
ment was added to overrule the erroneous opinion in Luke v. 
Dalow Industries, Inc., 114 and so the words "other entity" should 
be construed to refer to any person or litigant. 
no. Id. §§ 8.01-581.01 to -581.016. 
111. Fraley v. Nickels, 121 Va. 377, 93 S.E. 636 (1917). 
112. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.016 (Cum. Supp. 1986). 
113. Hot Springs Lodge No. 1817, Loyal Order of Moose v. Virginia Hot Springs, Inc., 3 
Va. Cir. 163 (Bath County 1984). 
114. 566 F. Supp. 1470 (E.D. Va. 1983). 

